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I want to praise "technology" as the important factor in the relative
growth performance of the nation-states’ economies. I want to argue that
the conventional wisdom substantially understates the role of differences
in total factor productivity in explaining differentials across nation-state
economies in GDP per capita. "Technology" in this sense is more
important, because of the strong endogeneity of population growth and
investment rates. Rich economies are economies in which children are
much more "consumption" than "investment" goods; these economies
have completed their demographic transitions to a r~gime of low fertility
and low population growth. Thus, an economy that initially finds itself
with a small advantage in total factor productivity will see that advantage
magnified into a larger advantage in output per capita, as it converges to
a steady-state growth path with lower population growth and a higher
capital-output ratio.
Similarly, a rich economy is one in which the price of capital goods
is relatively low: In a rich economy, a given share of national product
saved translates into a greater real investment effort than if the economy
had the world’s average relative price structure. This channel magnifies
differences in total factor productivity into larger differences in output per
capita, working through the steady-state capital-output ratio.
Researchers in economic growth have been puzzled by the apparent
combination of "conditional convergence" with absolute divergence.
Economies appear to be moving toward their individual steady-state
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growth paths by about 2 percent per year, yet the spread of relative
output per capita levels across the world continues to increase.
A naive interpretation Of this pattern would suggest that, at some
time in the past, nation-states’ savings and population growth rates--and
thus their levels of output per capita--were closer together than they are
now; that some shock drove savings and population growth rates apart;
and that since then the world’s distribution of relative incomes has
diverged as economies have traversed toward their steady-state growth
paths. But what was this shock that drove savings and population growth
rates apart? The evolution of the world’s cross-country distribution of
income and productivity is much more understandable once one recog-
nizes the endogeneity of factor accumulation, and the fact that relatively
poor countries have low investment rates and high rates of population
growth in large part because they are relatively poor.
But I also have a caveat: In another sense, I want to bury "technol-
ogy." Robert Solow’s (1957) seminal article is entitled "Technical Change
and the Aggregate Production Function." Certainly since 1957, and
perhaps before, economists have used "technical change" and "technol-
ogy" as shorthand ways of referring to shifts in the aggregate produc-
tion function. Yet much of the difference seen across nations in aggregate
total factor productivity has little to do with technology--in the sense of
knowledge of the internal combustion engine, continuous-casting, the
freeze-drying process, or anything that would be recognizable in a model
like that of Caballero and Jaffe (1993). Technology properly so-called is the
ultimate source of our enormous material wealth today relative to our
counterparts of a century or so ago: Economic growth over the past
century in the United States is built on our knowledge of the internal
combustion engine, continuous-casting, freeze-drying, and all of our
other technologies. Yet differences across nation-states in total factor
productivity seem to be related tenuously, or not at all, to technology.
Robert Solow may not have done us a big favor when he convinced
us to call shifts in the aggregate production function "technical change";
his doing so may not have helped economists to think clear thoughts over
the past 40 years.
DIVERGENCE
As best we can determine from badly flawed data, the economic
history of the past century and a quarter is a history not of "convergence"
but of "divergence": The different countries and peoples of the world
have not drawn closer together in relative living standards, but have
drifted further apart.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of world real GDP per capita--by
percentage of world population, not by nation-state--in 1993 and in 1870,
as best as it can be estimated. The 1993 estimates of real GDP per capitaCROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES 129
Figure 1
World Distributions of per Capita GDP, 1870 and 1993
(Purchasing Power Parity Concept}
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are purchasing-power-parity estimates, measured in the "international
dollar" concept that pegs U.S. GDP per capita to its current-dollar value,
but attempts to use the relative price structure not of the advanced
industrial economies but of the "world average" economy. They are
taken from the 1995 World Development Report. The 1870 estimates of real
GDP per capita are my own extensions and modifications of those found
in Maddison’s (1995) Monitoring the World Economy; by and large they
are constructed by "backcasting" individual, nation-specific estimates of
growth rates of real GDP per capita.
Thus, a very large number of caveats must be attached to Figure 1:
Because estimates of 1870 GDP per capita are "backcast," errors in
estimating 1993 GDP per capita are necessarily included in esti-
mates of 1870 GDP per capita as well.
The individual, nation-specific estimates of growth rates underly-
ing the backcasting are of widely variable quality; they do not use
the same methodology.
Most of the nation-states of today’s world did not exist in 1870.
Estimates for 1870 cover roughly the same area that the nation-
state occupies now.
Figure 1 suppresses all variability in productivity and real GDP130 1. Bradford De Long
per capita inside nation-states: Everyone in China in 1993 is
assumed to have the 1993 real GDP per capita of $2,330 estimated
using the purchasing-power-parity concept.
Estimates even for 1993 are very uncertain for developing coun-
tries. This applies especially to China which, as the World Bank
team politely puts it in a footnote, has a GDP per capita estimate
that is "subject to more than the usual margin of error."
The entire enterprise of computing levels of real GDP per capita
using the purchasing-power-parity concept may be seriously bi-
ased; it may fail to incorporate appropriate allowances for quality
differences between products produced in industrialized and in
developing economies. Certainly, purchasing-power-parity esti-
mates made in the 1980s of relative living standards east and west
of the Iron Curtain appear, in retrospect, to have wildly exagger-
ated the levels of productivity and material wealth in the former
Soviet Union’s sphere of influence.1
Estimates of growth in real GDP per capita between 1870 and 1993
are unlikely to incorporate adequately changes in quality and in
the scope of products that are produced. The thought experiment
that underlies constant-dollar, cross-time comparisons implicitly
involves taking the output produced at a particular date, moving
it across time to the base year, and selling it in the base year at the
base year’s market prices. But suppose you gave me $2,763--the
estimate of U.S. GDP per capita in 1870--and told me "By the
way, you can only spend this sum on products that existed in 1870
and at the quality levels that were produced then." Under these
stringent restrictions on what I could purchase, I might well value
that sum as worth much less than $2,763 in today’s dollars.
Figure 1--plotting approximate GDP per capita by percentile of
the world’s population--looks significantly different in some re-
spects from Figure 2, which plots GDP per capita in 1870 and 1993
by percentile of the world’s number of nation-states. Nation-state-
based calculations show a nearly uniforrrl distribution of log GDP
per capita levels over the observed range, especially for 1993.
Population-based calculations show a non-uniform distribution
with a pronounced upper tail: The difference, of course, springs
from the two very large populations of the nation-states China and
India, which are now and were in 1870 relatively poor.
~ Current exchange rate-based calculations of relative productivity levels and living
standards show differences an order of magnitude greater than do purchasing power
parity-based calculations; it may be that in some senses the exchange rate-based calculations
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Figure 2
1870 and 1993 Distributions of GDP per Capita, by Nation-State
(Purchasing Power Parity Concept)
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Nevertheless, Figure I is the best we can do at present. What are the
principal lessons of Figure 1? I believe that there are three. The first is the
extraordinary pace of real economic growth over the past century. The
highest level of GDP per capita attained in 1993 (for the United States)
was some $24,470 in 1993-level international dollars; the highest attained
in 1870 (for Australia) was some $4,108 in 1993-level international dollars.
Using this particular metric, the United States today is some six times as
wealthy in a material-product, real-income sense as was Australia in 1870
(and some nine times as well off as was the United States in 1870).2
I stress that this pace of growth is not only very fast but also
extraordinarily faster than in any previous century that we know of. If
1870-1993 growth were simply a continuation of pre-1870 growth trends,
2 This pace of real economic growth would be further magnified if the argument turned
out to be correct that measured growth in the GDP accounts fails to capture much of the
growth in real income that takes form of improvements in the quality and variety of
commodities. Such factors might lead standard estimates to understate "true" economic
growth over the past century by a factor of two or three. See, for example, Nordhaus (1994).
On the other hand, Simon Kuznets (1963) argued that the constant-dollar, current-base-year
calculations of real GDP that he designed were the most appropriate ones: that we should
use the yardstick of the present to assess the past.132 J. Bradfor~t De Long
then in 1600 the richest economy in the world would have had a real GDP
per capita level of some $110 a year--far too low to support human life.~
The twentieth century (extended back to 1870) has seen at least a
sixfold multiplication of real GDP per capita at the leading edge of the
world’s economies; the previous century and a quarter had seen per-
haps a doubling during the period of the classical Industrial Revolution
(Crafts 1985; Mokyr 1985). But before that? Perhaps the most prosperous
economy of the mid eighteenth century (probably the Netherlands) held
a 50-percent edge over the most prosperous economy of the mid fifteenth
century (probably the city-states of northern Italy). But perhaps not.
And looking more than 500 years into the past, it is hard to see any
significant advance in living standards or average productivity levels.
Human populations appear to have been in a near-Malthusian equilib-
rium, in which population growth quickly removes the margin for any
significant increase in living standards (Kremer 1993; Livi-Bacci 1992;
Malthus 1798). It is not clear that a French peasant of the seventeenth
century was any better off than an Athenian peasant of the fourth century
B.C.
The second important lesson of Figure 1 is the extremely uneven
pace of economic growth over the past century. Because the relatively
poor economies of the world have not yet completed their demographic
transitions to a r~gime of relatively low fertility, the.poorest economies
have had the fastest-growing populations over the past century. Inter-
national migration has not proceeded at a particularly fast pace. Thus,
the distribution of economic growth appears more uneven and less
widely distributed in Figure 1, which plots GDP per capita by percentile
of the world’s population, than in Figure 2, which plots GDP per capita
by nation-state.
But in both figures, the line plotting the world’s economic growth
has rotated clockwise about the bottom right corner. The richest econo-
mies today have some six to nine times the GDP per capita of their
counterparts in 1870; the median economy today has perhaps four times
the GDP per capita of its counterpart in 1870; the poorest economies are
little advanced over their counterparts of 1870, ’
To put this another way, the strong economic growth of the past
century--the rise in the geometric average of output per capita in the
world from some $760 to some $3,150 in 1993 international dollars per
year--has been accompanied by a substantial increase in variance as
well. In 1870, the standard deviation of log GDP per capita across the
world’s population was some 0.53; today it is 1.00. The range from one
standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean in
a A point made by Kuznets (1963), and expanded on in considerable depth by Pritchett
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log GDP per capita took up the interval from $450 to $1,310 international
dollars in 1870; the same interval runs from $1,160 to $8,510 international
dollars today.
The third lesson is that by and large the economies that were rich in
relative terms in 1870 are rich in relative terms today, and the economies
that were poor in relative terms in 1870 are poor in relative terms today
(Figure 3). Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) draw a distinction between
what they call ~r-divergenc.e and/3-divergence. They call "~r-divergence"
the case where the variance of a distribution grows despite a tendency for
any given element to revert toward the mean over time; they call
"/3-divergence" the case where the variance of the distribution would
continue to widen even in the absence of all shocks--when there is no
systematic regression toward the mean.
The world since 1870 has exhibited not only o-divergence but also
/3-divergence: The world’s distribution has a greater spread today be-
cause there has been a systematic tendency for the relatively rich
economics to grow faster than the relatively poor, and not because shocks
to individual nation-states’ GDP per capita levels have dominated
regression to the mean. Table 1 documents this by reporting simple
regressions of nation-states’ log GDP per capita levels in 1993 on the level
of 1870. If two economies’ log GDP per capita levels were separated by an
amount X in 1870, they were separated by 1.542(X) in 1993.
The degree of /3-divergence is slightly attenuated when continent
dummies are added to the right-hand side. The continent dummies have
the standard pattern: strongly positive for North America, strongly
negative for Africa. More interesting, perhaps, is some evidence that GDP
per capita levels have tended to converge over the. past century and a
quarter, if attention is confined to those economies that were in the richer
half of the sample in 1870.4
The fact that the distribution of income and productivity levels
across nation states has been diverging goes oddly with a large number
of studies (see Cogley and Spiegel 1996; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992)
that find evidence for "conditional convergence": Gaps between an
economy’s aggregate income and productivity level, and the level corre-
sponding to the steady-state growth path predicted by its investment and
population growth rates, shrink over time by some 2 to 3 percent per
year.
4 Williamson (1996) and Taylor and Williamson (1994) point to the factors--largely
international migration, increasing trade, and thus converging factor and commodity
prices--making for "convergence" among relatively well-off economies before World War L
Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) point to similar factors and document similar "convergence"
within the club of relatively rich OECD economies after World War II. Lewis (1978) attempts
to account for the failure of relatively poor economies to industrialize before and after
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Figure 3B
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Figure 3C
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Table 1
Simple Convergence Regressions, 1870 and 1993
With
Log 1870 GDP Continent
per Capita Dummies R2
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Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Well (1992) were among the
first to stress the existence of conditional cor~vergence in the post-World
War II growth rates of a cross section of nation-state economies. Mankiw
(1995) interprets this finding as indicating that the straightforward Solow
growth model is working better and better as time passes: It is becoming
more and more the case that differences across nations in relative levels
of GDP per capita are reflections of the differences in steady-state capital
intensity implied by their rates of factor accumulation and populhtion
growth.
Yet the appearance of conditional convergence--a coefficient of
between -2 and -3 percent per year when the growth rate is regressed
on the difference between an economy’s i~-titial level of GDP per capita
and the steady-state level implied by its investment and population
growth rates--fits oddly with the fact, clocumented in the previous
section, of unconditional divergence. Ho~r can economies be traversing
toward their steady states and at the same time be drawing further and
further apart in relative GDP per capita levels?
A naive interpretation of this patterr~ would suggest that at some138 J. Bradford De Long
time in the past, nation-states" savings and population growth rates must
have been much more closely bunched together than they are today. This
would mean that at that time, economies’ steady-state and actual levels
of output per capita also were bunched together more closely than they
are today, and that some economic shock or series of shocks has since
driven their respective savings and population growth rates apart. Thus,
the world’s relative distribution of incomes has diverged since, as the
world’s relative economies have traversed toward their now distantly
separated paths of steady-state growth.
But this naive interpretation has a central problem: What was this
shock that drove savings and population growth rates apart? The
principal candidate would be the Industrial Revolution. But the Indus-
trial Revolution saw not a fall but a sharp rise in population growth rates
in the most heavily affected economies (Livi-Bacci 1992). And today very
little is left of Rostow’s (1957) bold hypothesis that the key to the
Industrial Revolution was a sharp rise in investment as a share of national
product (Crafts 1985; Mokyr 1985). The shifts in investment and in
population growth rates brought about by the Industrial Revolution did
not occur in the directions that would support such an interpretation.
Other candidates for a shock sharp enough to drive economies’
investment and population growth rates away from one another simply
are absent. The overwhelming bulk of the divergence in GDP per capita
over the past century and a quarter has been due to the uneven spread
of the Industrial Revolution, and to differences in relative national rates
of growth in total factor productivity. But why, then, the finding of
conditional convergence, and the strong positive association of per capita
levels of GDP with investment rates and the negative association with
population growth rates?
Population Growth and the Demographic Transition
One reason is the endogeneity of population growth. Sometime
between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries, the human race
passed through what we all hope was its last "Malthusian" episode, in
which rising population and limited agricultural resources led to nutri-
tional deficits, higher than average mortality, and population stagnation.
Since then, the pace of productivity improvement in agriculture has
kept ahead of agricultural resource scarcity and the population growth
that has carried the world’s population from one to six billion, so far.
Nutrition has been relatively high by historical standards, natural fertility
high as well, and natural mortality low.
In the past, the richest human populations appear to have also seen
the fastest population growth. But, starting perhaps in eighteenth century
France, a new pattern began to emerge, in which increases in GDP per
capita led not to greater fertility and faster population growth but toCROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES 139
Figure 4
U.S. Population Growth and GDP per Capita,
1790 - Present
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lower fertility and slower population growth.-The number of girls born
per potential mother fell, and population growth rates slowed.
Figure 4 shows this pattern at work in the United States over the past
two centuries: As GDP per capita has grown, the rate of natural increase
of the U.S. population has fallen steadily. Once U.S. GDP per capita grew
beyond $2,000 or so (1993 dollars), fertility began to drop sharply enough
to offset the declines in mortality that accompanied better medical care
and rising material prosperity. The rate of population growth, excluding
net immigration, is now little over 1 percent per year--far below the 3.5
percent per year in natural population increase seen in the first half-
century of the Republic.
The pattern of rising material prosperity and falling natural popula-
tion increase has had only one significant interruption in the United
States in the past two centuries. The Great Depression of the 1930s saw a
very sharp fall in childbearing and a reduction in natural population
growth to only 0.7 percent per year. In what Richard Easterlin (1982) sees
as a delayed response to the Great Depression that balanced out the birth
deficit of the 1930s, births rose in the 1950s "baby boom" to a level not
seen since the nineteenth century.140 ]. Bradford De Long
The pattern of increasing material wealth and slowing population
growth seen in the United States is completely typical of the pattern
followed so far by all nations that have successfully industrialized. Each
tripling of GDP per capita has been associated with an approximately
I percentage point fall in the annual rate of natural population increase.
To my knowledge, no one has ever argued that falling population
growth in the United States has any sources other than our increasing
material prosperity and the changes in social and economic organization
that have followed from it. A richer country has more literate women,
and literate women--worldwide--are very interested in effective birth
control. In a poorer country, the average level of education is low and
children can be put to work at a relatively early age, thus augmenting the
production resources of the household. In a richer country, the average
level of education is high and children are a major drain on household
cash flow for nearly two decades.
Children in relatively poor, low-productivity economies are much
like an "investment" good: They are a way to augment the economic
resources of the household in a time span of a decade or so. By contrast,
children in relatively rich, high-productivity economies are more like a
"consumption" good. Thus, we would expect to see--and we do see--a
substantial correlation between high GDP per capita and low population
growth, arising not so much because low population growth leads to a
higher steady-state capital-output ratio but because of the demographic
transition: the changes in fertility that have so far been experienced in
every single industrialized economy.
The Relative Price of Investment Goods
Begin with the large divergence between purchasing power parity
and current exchange rate measures of relative levels of GDP per capita.
The spread between the highest and lowest levels of GDP per capita
today, using curren~ exchange rate-based measures, is a factor of 400;
the spread between the highest and lowest GDP per capita levels, using
purchasing power parity-based measures, is a factor of 50. If the purchas-
ing power parity-based measures are correct, real exchange rates vary by
a factor of eight between relatively rich and relatively poor economies.
And the log GDP per capita level accounts for 80 percent of the
cross-country variation in this measure of the real exchange rate, with
each 1 percent rise in GDP per capita associated with a 0.34 percent rise
in the real exchange rate (Figure 5).
Real exchange rates make the prices of traded manufactured goods
roughly the same in the different nation-states of the world, putting to
one side over- or undervaluations produced by macroeconomic condi-
tions, tariffs and other trade barriers, and desired international invest-
ment flows. Thus, the eightfold difference in real exchange rates betweenCROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES 141
Figure 5
Log Real Exchange Rate, and Log GDP per Worker
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relatively rich and relatively poor economies is a reflection of an
approximately eightfold difference in the price of easily traded manufac-
tured goods: Relative to the average basket of goods and prices on which
the "international dollar" measure is based, the real price of traded
manufactures in relatively rich countries is only one-eighth the real price
in relatively poor countries.
This should come as no surprise. The world’s most industrialized
and prosperous economies are the most industrialized and prosperous
because they have attained very high levels of manufacturing productiv-
ity. Their productivity advantage in unskilled service industries is much
lower than that in capital- and technology-intensive manufactured goods.
And a low relative price of technologically sophisticated manufactured
goods has important consequences for nation-states’ relative investment
rates. In the United States today, machinery and equipment account for
one-half of all investment spending; in developing economies--where
machinery and equipment, especially imported machinery and equip-
ment, are much more expensive--they typically account for a much
greater share of total investment spending (Jones 1994; De Long and
Summers 1991).142 J. Bradford De Long
Table 2
Consequences for National Investment of Relative Poverty and a High Price of
Capital Goods
Level of Real Exchange Nominal Savings Real Investment
Rate-Based Price Level of Share of GDP Share of GDP
GDP per Capita Machinery (Percent) (Percent)
$24,000 100 20,0 20,0
$ 6,000 160 20.0 15.4
$ 1,500 257 20,0 11.2
$ 375 411 20.0 7,8
$ 95 659 20,0 5,3
Consider the implications of a higher relative price of capital goods
for a developing economy attempting to invest in a balanced mix of
machinery and structures. There is no consistent trend in the relative
price of structures across economies: Rich economies can use bulldozers
to dig foundations, but poor economies can use large numbers of
low-paid unskilled workers to dig foundations. But the higher relative
price of machinery capital in developing countries makes it more and
more expensive to maintain a balanced mix: The poorer a country, the
lower is the real investment share of GDP that corresponds to any given
nominal savings share of GDP.
Table 2 shows the consequences--the gap between nominal savings
and real investment shares of GDP--that follow from the high relative
price of machinery and equipment in poor countries that wish to
maintain a balanced mix of investment in structures and equipment.
For a country at the level of the world’s poorest today--with a level of
real exchange rate-based GDP per capita of some $95 a year--saving 20
percent of national product produces a real investment share (measured
using the "international dollar" measure) of only some 5 percent of
national product.
In fact, poor economies do not maintain balanced mixes of structures
and equipment capital: They cannot afford to do so, and so they
economize substantially on machinery and equipment. Thus, here are
two additional channels by which relative poverty is a cause of slow
growth. First, relative poverty is the source of a high real price of capital,
a low rate of real investment corresponding to any given nominal savings
effort, and a low steady-state ratio of capital to output. Second, to the
extent that machinery and equipment are investments with social prod-
ucts that significantly exceed the profits earned by investors (see De Long
and Summers 1991), the price of structures in relatively poor developing
economies leads them to economize on exactly the wrong kinds of capital
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The Implications
The standard Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) growth model, written
in per worker terms and expressed in logs, contains the production
function:
In(y) = o~ In(k) (1)
where y is output per worker, k is capital per worker, o~ is the capital share
in the production function, and ~- is the log of total factor productivity. If
the economy has a constant investment rate /, a constant population
growth rate n, and labor efficiency growth and depreciation rates g and 8,
then in a steady state at any point in time, output per worker will be given
by:
In(y) = 1 - a     (In(l) - ln(n + g + 8)) + 1-~a (2)
Suppose, however, that we take account of the feedback from GDP
per capita levels on population growth rates:
In(n + g + 8) = -q~ In(y) + v (3)
where n is that portion of ln(n + g + 8) not accounted for by the
combination of the dependence of population growth on output and the
background rates of labor efficiency growth and depreciation. The pattern
of demographic evolution from the U.S. historical experience suggests
that the parameter q~ is, over the relevant range, approximately equal to
0.2.
And suppose we take account of the feedback from GDP per capita
levels to the real investment share:
In(l) = In(s) - ln(pk) = In(s) + (4)
where s is the economy’s nominal savings share, Pk is the real price of
capital goods, ~/is the deviation of the price of capital goods from what
would have been predicted given the level of real output, and 0--the
elasticity of capital goods prices with respect to output--is roughly equal
to 0.3 over the range relevant for developing economies.
Combining (2), (3), and (4) produces an expression for the steady-
state level of output, allowing for the endogeneity of population growth
rates as a result of the demographic transition and for the dependence of
the relative price of investment on output per worker:
a ln(s) - c~ - av + ~"
In(y) = 1 - o~ - ~0 - o~q~ (5)144 I. Bradford De Long
Table 3
Consequences for Steady State of Endogenous Population Growth and
Capital Goods Prices
Capital Denominator of Effect of Total
Share ~ Equation (5) Effect of s, g, ~ Factor Productivity
,20 ,70 ,29 1,43
.40 .40 1,00 2.50
.60 ,10 6,00 10.00
.67 .00 ~o oo
Equation (5) allows us to calculate, for various possible values for the
share a of produced capital goods in the production function and for the
chosen values of ~ and 0, the impact on the level of the steady-state
growth path of a shift in the exogenous component of savings, capital
goods prices, population growth, or total factor productivity. Because
they enter symmetrically into equation (5), the effects of the first three are
the same.
Table 3 reports that--with a share of produced factor inputs in the
production function of 0.4--a I percent increase in the savings rate (or a
I percent fall in the exogenous component of capital goods prices) carries
with it a 1 percent increase in the steady-state level of output. But a 1
percent increase in total factor productivity raises the steady-state level of
output by fully 2.5 percent. Growth-accounting decompositions would, if
applied to such an economy, attribute only 1 percent of the higher level
of output to higher total factor productivity--less than two-fifths of the
total effect. The growth accounting decomposition is not wrong, but
incomplete: To the extent that the higher capital stock is a result of higher
total factor productivity reducing the relative price of capital, and to the
extent that higher total factor productivity pushes an economy further
along its demographic transition to low population growth, exogenous
shifts in total factor productivity have effects that are orders of magnitude
greater than growth accounting procedures suggest, even without any
powerful externalities in the production function.
Equally interesting, perhaps, is the case in which there are external-
ities to investment--whether in infrastructure, in research and develop-
ment, in human capital, or in machinery and equipment--and in which
the true capital share a in the production function is substantially greater
than the 0.4 found in the usual specifications of the Solow model. The true
capital share cannot get as high as 0.67 without triggering explosive paths
for output per capita, in which very small boosts to total factor produc-
tivity set in motion patterns of population growth reduction and invest-
ment increase that converge to no steady state at all, but simply grow
until the log-linear approximations in equations (3) and (4) break down.CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES 145
It is difficult to look at th~ cross-country pattern of growth over the
past century without thinking that the determinants of the steady-state
growth paths toward which countries converge must be nearly singular.
What differences between Canada and Argentina in 1870 would have led
anyone to forecast their now more than two and one-half-fold difference
in GDP per capita? Or the twentyfold gap between Taiwan and India?
Recognizing the endogeneity of the demographic transition and of
investment has the potential to help us understand why the economic
history of the past century and a quarter has proceeded as it did, without
requiring assumptions of external effects that seem perhaps implausibly
large.
The endogeneity of the demographic transition, and of investment,
also helps make sense of the odd combination of global divergence
together with "conditional convergence." To the extent that relatively low
productivity today is a cause of an economy’s attraction to a low
steady-state growth path, it is less necessary to look for shocks in the past
that both pushed economies away from their long-run growth paths and
pushed economies’ GDP per capita levels together, if we want to account
for the evolution of the world’s distribution of income.
Caveat
But I still have one important caveat: Do we really want to refer to
shifts in the aggregate production function as "technical change" and
"technology"? Much of the difference seen across nations in aggregate
total factor productivity seems to have little to do with technology per se.
Consider Greg Clark’s (1987) excellent study of productivity in the
cotton textile industry circa 1910. Table 4 reports some of Clark’s
calculations, most strikingly the sevenfold difference in labor productiv-
ity found between mills in the United States and cotton mills in the region
of China near Shanghai.
Table 4
International Productivity in Cotton Textiles, circa 1910
Output per Staffing Levels
Country Worker-Hour (Machines per Worker)
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The most striking thing about this sevenfold differential--the point
of Clark’s article--is that all of these mills used the same technology, if that
word has any meaning. Japanese, Chinese, and Indian cotton mills had no
local source of capital goods, so they bought and imported textile
machinery made in the same machine shops near Liverpool that British
manufacturers used. The United States produced its own textile machin-
ery; Belgium, France, Germany, and Austria produced textile machinery
as well. But everyone else imported capital goods--and in many cases,
according to Clark, paid British mechanics to assemble and install it as
well.
Yet with the same technology--the same machinery, the same pro-
duction process, the same automated transformation of raw materials by
metal and chemistry into final product--Clark found differences in labor
productivity that reached three-to-one even when comparing the United
States to Italy, a country with a very long history of textile production.
The key to the differences in labor productivity is found in the last
column of Table 4: staffing levels. In the United States, one operative took
care of three machines. In China, two operatives took care of one
machine. Add this sixfold differences in staffing levels to the perhaps 15
percent lower output per machine-hour near Shanghai to obtain an
arithmetic explanation of the sevenfold difference in output per worker.
Since Clark wrote his article, a cottage industry has sprung up to try
to explain how all of these textile mills could still be operating on the
same production function. Perhaps the extra workers in the Asian mills
were substituting for a poorer quality of raw materials? After all,
poorer-quality raw materials would lead to more breaks, snarls, and
machine stoppages that would have to be corrected. Perhaps the extra
workers in the Asian mills allowed machines to run faster? Perhaps the
extra workers allowed the machines to run with less downtime? Not one
of the attempts to establish that these textile mills were working on the
same production function, with Asian mills getting increased output (or
diminished other inputs) in return for their higher staffing levels, has
been convincing. The turn-of-the-last-century cotton textile industry did
exhibit very large differences in productivity across countries, yes. But the
differences are not readily attributable to differences in anything I would
call technology.
Or consider the McKinsey Global Institute’s (1993) study of manu-
facturing productivity in the United States, Germany, and Japan--a study
carried out with the assistance of Martin Baily and Robert Solow. As
best they could estimate, Japanese manufacturing productivity in 1990
varied from 33 percent of the U.S. level in food processing to 147 percent
of the U.S. level in steel. German manufacturing productivity varied from
43 percent of the U.S. level in beer to 91 percent of the U.S. level in
metalworking (Figure 6).
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ences in technology, it is hard to understand how Japanese businesses can
be so successful at learning and developing technologies for making
automobile parts, and so inept at learning and developing technologies
for freezing fish. True differences in technology surely are a greater factor
in comparisons between countries further apart in the world distribution
of GDP per capita than Germany, Japan, and the United States: Devel-
oping economies do use last generation’s or even last century’s proce-
dures and practices because they cannot afford the capital goods that
embody today’s, because they do not have the mechanics to maintain
today’s, or because they have different factor price structures that make it
more costly to use today’s best practice. But even identical technologies
can yield very different productivities. A lot more is going on.
CONCLUSION
Thus, the moral of this paper is that "technology" is both more
important and less important a factor in accounting for relative national
levels of prosperity than the conventional wisdom suggests. Technolo-
gy-in the sense of differences in total factor productivity--is more
important because of the strong endogeneity of population growth and148 J. Bradford De Long
capital investment rates. Countries that are rich have low rates of
population growth: They have completed their demographic transitions
to a r~gime in which fertility is relatively low and their children have
become more "consumption" than "investment" goods. Countries that
are rich also have relatively low prices of capital goods--a given share
of national product saved implies a higher ratio of investment to GDP.
Hence, being rich tends to make a nation-state’s capital-output ratio high.
Thus, small differences in total factor productivity can translate
into large differences in productivity levels and living standards, once the
feedback from a richer economy to higher investment and lower popu-
lation growth rates is taken into account. Studies examining the impact
of total factor productivity differences on output per capita that hold
savings and population growth rates constant understate the true long-
run impact of raising total factor productivity.
On the other hand, technology--in the sense of knowledge of the
internal combustion engine, continuous-casting, or freeze-drying--is
much less important in accounting for differences across nations. Many
differences in total factor productivity are related tenuously, or not at all,
to differences in technology. All of the textile factories at the turn of the
last century were equipped with the same or similar machines, many
of them from the same machine shops in Lowell, Massachusetts or
Manchester, Lancashire.
This should not be taken to imply that technology per se is unimpor-
tant in long-run economic growth. It is very important in those particular
industries that are near the active edge of technological expansion and
intensive in research and development. Indeed, better technology today
is the sole important reason why we today have six to 20 times the
standard of living of our predecessors in 1870. But it has much less to do
with the sources of aggregate productivity differences across nations.
The last wave of research on aggregate growth theory called forth
an effort, by Abramovitz (1956, 1986) and Denison (1967) among others,
to try to decompose aggregate total factor productivity differences into
more interesting and meaningful components. It is too bad that the
current wave of research on aggregate growth has failed to generate a
corre.sponding effort.
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Jeffrey A. Frankel*
Upon my first reading of J. Bradford De Long’s paper, my reaction
was to be impressed with its clarity and convinced by its basic arguments.
He takes on some big ideas regarding the statistical record of cross-
country growth rates, and he provokes the reader into new and useful
thoughts. I expected, at most, to be pointing out some missing references
that are relevant to the central point, the endogeneity of investment and
other standard determinants of growth. Upon further thought, I remain
impressed by his clarity and stimulated by his ideas, but no longer so
convinced of all his conclusions.
The basic starting point is an apparent paradox. On the one hand,
countries’ income levels have failed to converge over time. In fact, the
inequality among nations has actually increased by most standard
measures. On the other hand, when we condition on the standard
determinants of growth such as investment and population growth, we
find a tendency for inequality to diminish--the finding now known as
conditional convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Mankiw, Romer,
and Weil 1992). There is no contradiction here, but an interesting pair of
major trends remain to be explained. It would be nice to be able to fold
them into a single explanation. How tan this be done?
De Long’s explanation is elegant in its simplicity. Initial differences in
technology, for example, Britain’s Industrial Revolution, have become
increasingly magnified with the passage of time because of two channels.
First, higher income levels lead to less rapid population growth. Popu-
*Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for International and Development
Economics Research, University of California at Berkeley. The author would like to thank
Teresa Cyrus for very efficient research assistance, and Jeffrey Hammer for useful dis-
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lation growth is, in turn, a standard negative determinant of GNP per
capita in the neoclassical growth model of Solow (not to mention in
earlier contributions going back to Malthus). The reason is that higher
population growth means that more of investment is used up equipping
workers with the already existing level of capital, and less is left over to
raise the capital/labor ratio. Second, higher income levels lead to lower
relative prices of capital goods, so that a given saving rate buys more real
investment. Through both cham~els, the initial divergence in incomes
becomes self-reinforcing.
My response falls into several parts. First, I will recall previous
authors who have made similar points, together with some additional
ways that the standard determinants of growth could in theory be
endogenous. Then, I will discuss some empirical evidence: on conver-
gence itself, on the timing of increases in investment, and on what causes
some countries to converge and others not.
DOCTRINAL ~’~ISTORY
Both the endogeneity of investment and the endogeneity of popula-
tion growth are points that are long-known and well-known. Perhaps
they are better known in the development literature than in the growth
literature. In the case of investment, the specific channel mentioned by
DeLong, via the relative price of capital goods, is new, so far as I know.
But many have noted that saving (and therefore investment) might
change as income rises.
One possible channel comes out of the same demographic transition
described by De Long: A lower ratio of children to working-age popula-
tion implies a higher saving rate, according to the life-cycle hypothesis
(Mason 1987; Leff 1969). Other possible effects have been suggested as
well. The development process is often accompanied by the growth of
more sophisticated financial systems, as well as pension plans and social
security systems. This evolution can lead not only to more saving and
investment, but also to lower population growth, since a prime motive in
poor countries for having many children is that they provide the only
form of insurance against destitution in old age.I Investment in human
capit~l is often greater in rich countries than in poor countries, perhaps
because education is a superior good.
I would like to add another effect to the list. The growth literature
often falls into the habit of speaking of national saving and investment
interchangeably. But the two differ; the difference is net foreign borrow-
ing. Countries undergoing rapid growth often find foreign capital in-
creasingly available, perhaps even to a greater extent than they would
1 For citations on all these points, see Hammer (1985) or Kelley (1988, pp. 1706-07).DISCUSSION 153
like, as some emerging market countries found in the 1990s. The
increased ease of international financing of investment is another way
that this key determinant of growth can be endogenous.
Some effects can also go the other way. Not everyone agrees that
population growth has a clear negative effect on income per capita. A
longer life span leads to an increased ratio of elderly to working-age
population, which in turn results in a fall in saving, according to the
life-cycle hypothesis. Another effect is symmetric to De Long’s effect on
the price of capital goods. As he points out, countries as they grow tend
to undergo a real appreciation of their currency, and thus an increase in
their relative price of nontraded goods and services, versus traded goods.
But just as this means cheaper capital goods, it also means more
expensive education. Thus, a given saving rate buys less real investment
in human capital (as parents of today’s students are well aware). I would
not argue that either of these two effects dominates the ones that work to
reinforce growth, though someone else might.
Perhaps the most important precedent for De Long’s argument is
research by Richard Nelson.2 He argued precisely that, because popula-
tion growth and saving could be endogenous, a takeoff in growth could
become self-sustaining. The alternative was what he called a "low-level
equilibrium trap," in which a country is unable to achieve growth until it
gets its population growth down and its saving rate up, but is unable to
get its population growth down and its saving rate up until it achieves
growth. This sort of model leads directly to De Long’s worldwide
divergence.
Before I leave the subject of doctrinal history, I want to make a
comment on De Long’s characterization of technology. He says, on the
one hand, that shifts in total factor productivity are more important than
sometimes thought, in that they, rather than added inputs per capita,
form the origin of the self-sustaining takeoff. But, on the other hand, he
says that Solow’s labeling such shifts as technology "may not have helped
economists think clear thoughts over the past 40 years." I do not believe
Bob Solow needs me to defend him, and in any case I am sure that no
lack of respect for his contributions in this area was meant. Nevertheless,
I thought I would recall the relevant two sentences from Solow (1957):
"I am using the phrase ’technical change’ as a shorthand expression for
any kind of shift in the production function. Thus slowdowns, speedups,
improvements in the education of the labor force, and all sorts of things
will appear as ’technical change.’" From the start, there has been plenty
of awareness that the Solow residual was only "a measure of our
ignorance," and that it could be influenced by managerial practices,
government-induced distortions, cultural factors, and a hundred other
Nelson (1956 and 1960, p. 378); see also Jones (1976, p. 88).154 Jed~rey A. Frankel
aspects of how countries organize their economies, as easily as by the
mastery of the internal combustion engine or the freeze-drying process.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Now I will turn to empirical observation. The divergence in per
capita incomes that De Long identifies is striking, but this generalization
is a bit too sweeping and unqualified. Some of the most important trends
over the postwar period are obscured.
In 1870, the self-evident generalization would have been that Europe
and European-settled regions had achieved remarkable growth and other
regions had not. In the middle of this century, the picture did not look
very different, with a few exceptions: Japan had industrialized, while
Latin America had fallen behind (most dramatically Argentina and
Uruguay, which in 1870 had been as rich as Norway, as one can see from
De Long’s interesting Figure 3a). But when numerous colonies gained
their independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the great hopes that many had
for their rapid economic development were based on theory, on politics,
on hope--on anything but historical experience. By 1980, those hopes
had been dashed. It seemed that countries developed if and only if they
were European (with Japan the only major exception).
Now, at last, this situation has suddenly changed. A group of East
Asian nations, led by the four tigers, have joined the class of industrial-
ized countries. On a per capita basis, Hong Kong and Singapore are now
richer than Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and many other
industrial countries. At the same time, a group of European nations, led
by the former Soviet Union, have joined the class of less-developed
countries.
On an aggregate basis, the U.S. share of Gross World Product has
declined from almost one-half after World War II to less than one-fourth.
China has surpassed Japan and Germany, in terms of total GDP. India
has surpassed France, Italy, and Britain. Brazil and Mexico have sur-
passed Canada. Indonesia has surpassed Spain. Korea and Thailand have
surpassed Australia. If the criterion were economic size, three of these
countries would have a greater claim to be in the G-7 than does Canada,
as would others within the foreseeable future.3
Why, then, does De Long find divergence rather than convergence?
Romer (1986, 1989), Sala-i-Martin (1995), and others find the same. (This
result has been an important stimulus to the recent surge in growth
theory.) But still others conclude the opposite. For instance, Baumol
3 Frankel (1996). These comparisons are on a Purchasing Power Parity basis. If one does
the comparison on the basis of current exchange rates, then the Third World countries do
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(1986), Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), and others see convergence among
developed countries.4 De Long (1988), in a earlier paper, attributed this
finding to sample selection bias. That critique was convincing. Neverthe-
less, a number of authors have found convergence within groups of
countries, such as Europe, or within groups of regions within countries,
such as states of the United States, prefectures of Japan, or provinces
within other countries. These findings are not due to sample selection
bias. Sala-i-Martin describes them as another kind of "conditional con-
vergence," conditioning now on a class of countries or regions, rather
than on factor accumulation or other determinants of growth.
I think we have to go at least one cut deeper than simply looking at
the variance across all countries. We have to consider which kinds of
countries have converged and which kinds have not. Clearly, most East
Asian countries have done well, while most African countries have
not. Indeed, this last is an understatement. Some Asian countries have
virtually completed convergence with European levels of development,
while most African countries have made no progress in this regard at all.
Why is this?
The large empirical literature on cross-country growth comparisons
has found many explanations. The most robust are definitely the rates of
investment in physical and human capital, which are high in East Asia.
(Population growth shows up much less consistently.) Indeed, Young
(1995) and his popularizer Krugman (1994) have started many people
with their claims that factor accumulation explains most or all of the
superior performance of the Newly Industrialized Economies of East
Asia. Little is left to be attributed to technical change or total factor pro-
ductivity growth, whether interpreted as technology or Confucianism.
For present purposes, the key question is whether the high rates of
investment in East Asia were a cause of the takeoffs of the high-
performing economies, as is most often assumed traditionally, or whether
they merely resulted from and amplified the high growth rates once they
were already under way, as De Long argues (and the same for lower rates
of population growth). Both channels that De Long mentions should
require time to occur--certainly the demographic transition takes time,
and so I think does the process of bidding up the price of nontraded
4 Helpman (1987), in a different context (the connection between income and trade,
discussed below) and with a different measure, found that the dispersion of incomes
has fallen over the postwar period. That calculation, like Baumol’s, was on a sample of
developed countries, but Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) reproduced the result on a sample
of developing countries. While difference in sample may play a role, the major explanation
for this finding is probably that these authors are looking at countries’ total GDPs, while the
growth literature works with countries’ per capita GDPs. The demographic transition says
that rich countries have lower population growth than middle-income countries, so the
distribution across countries could become more equal over time for total incomes, even as
it becomes less equal for per capita incomes.156 JeJfrey A. Frankel
goods and services relative to internationally traded capital goods. Thus,
one can look to see whether the changes occurred early in the takeoff
process, supporting the traditional interpretation, or followed it, support-
ing De Long’s interpretation. The one thing that seems to me missing
from this paper is such an attempt to test the timing from the data.
I have plotted the investment rates and population growth rates of
the East Asian countries over the past 30 to 40 years, the time span of their
takeoffs.5 (See the Figures, in the Appendix.) Most cases show very little
evidence of population growth declining more in the aftermath of the
peak in growth rates than it did before. Perhaps most of these countries
will complete their demographic transitions in the future, but they have
not yet done so. Investment rates show much more evidence of favorable
changes after the peak in growth rates. However, they also show large
increases in investment that pre-date the peak in growth rates, and these
appear to be likely candidates for the cause of the takeoff, contrary to the
De Long hypothesis. Perhaps the point about endogeneity of investment
rates and self-reinforcing growth is correct, and yet the point about the
initial takeoff being due more to exogenous technology than to exogenous
investment differences is incorrect. More systematic analysis is needed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This discussion leaves out many other determinants of growth. I
cannot end my comment without calling attention to one of them:
openness to trade and investment. Many studies have found that open-
ness, in addition to factor accumulation, is an important determinant of
growth. Furthermore, this relationship survives accusations of simulta-
neity that have been frequently leveled against it, analogously to the
point about the endogeneity of investment (Frankel and Romer 1996;
Frankel, Romer, and Cyrus 1995). The countries that have converged are
those that are open. This observation can explain convergence within
the OECD, within Europe, within the United States, and within other
countries. It is also part of the success of the East Asian countries.
Openness is how countries absorb the best technology from the leaders,
whether it is technology in the technological sense, or in more general
organizational, managerial, and cultural senses. (See, for example, Gross-
man and Helpman 1991.)
Openness, by the way, is another self-reinforcing mechanism. While
trade promotes growth, without question growth also promotes trade.
s This is a more compressed time span than that in which the transition of the
industrialized countries occurred. But the time taken by the East Asian tigers to double their
incomes has been only about 10 years, whereas it originally took the United States 47 years
to do so (from 1839), and the United Kingdom 58 years (from 1780).DISCUSSION 157
Countries tend to lower tariffs, for example, as they become richer. Trade
has made East Asia today a powerful, self-sustaining growth area. The
trade is the result (as is well-known) of pro-trade policies and also (I
would argue) of the proximity of the East Asian countries to each other.
At their takeoff stages, they were dependent on the North American
market for trade. In the 1990s, however, they have continued to chug
along on their own, even when the United States and Japan were in
recession--another example of self-reinforcing growth.
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Appendix: Does Investment Rise Before, or After, the Growth Takeoff?
Figure 1
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This paper by J. Bradford De Long provides a clear and provocative
overview of a number of issues related to long-run trends in economic
growth. The paper makes five important points. First, the historical
record provides us with the task of reconciling the fact that income
per capita has been diverging across nations (unconditional divergence)
at the same time that countries individually appear to be converging
towards the steady-state income levels implied by their savings and
population growth rates (conditional convergence). Second, population
growth rates are endogenous, tending to decline as per capita income
rises. Third, the real price of investment goods is also endogenous, and
tending to decline as income rises. Fourth, both of these "positive
feedback" effects amplify the impact of differences in productivity across
countries. And fifth, such productivity differences are not determined
solely, or perhaps even primarily, by "technology" as that term is
normally defined.
There is much that I agree with in this presentation, at least
qualitatively. In my comment, I wish to make three points that bear
primarily on the interpretation and implications of these findings. First, I
believe that the evidence for the qualitative endogeneity of population
growth and the real price of investment goods is compelling. These
phenomena undoubtedly are important in understanding the historical
record, particularly the dramatic failure of some of the world’s underde-
veloped countries to grow. Second, it is less clear that modeling these
phenomena as continuous functions, and analyzing their effects in the
steady state, is the most useful approach. The change in population
*Associate Professor of Economics, Brandeis University.168 Adam B. Jaff:e
growth, particularly, is more likely to behave as a one-time transition,
its occurrence facilitated by high income. Finally, I would put aside the
semantic question of which shifters of the aggregate production ftmction
ought to be labeled "technology" and which "not technology." But I
would endorse the charge to disaggregate the different sources of such
shifts and to understand how economic incentives and effects differ for
different sources of productivity improvements.
THE CASE FOR QUALITATIVE
ENDOGENEITY IS COMPELLING
De Long’s paper makes the case for the effect of income on popula-
tion growth primarily by reference to the historical record in the United
States. This case can be augmented by the cross-sectional evidence
presented in my Figure 1. This plot shows a strong negative relationship
between the log of purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita income
and the rate of population growth. The simple correlation coefficient
between the two series is about -0.6, and a regression line implies that an
increase in income from $1,000 to $10,000 per capita is associated with a
decline in population growth from about 2.5 percent per year to about
1.5 percent per year. Of course, causality rtms in both directions here. But
the magnitude of the relationship makes it implausible that it is due
entirely to high population.growth leading to low income per head. If two
countries started out at the same income level, but one had population
growth of 1.5 percent and one had population growth of 2.5 percent, it
would take 156 years for the per capita income of the less fertile country
to reach 10 times that of the other, all else equal. Hence, the cross-section
evidence supports the proposition that the countries in the lower right-
hand corner of the scatter have high rates of population growth because
they have low income, to a significant extent.
My acceptance of the effect of income on the price of investment
goods has a theoretical rather than an empirical basis. By definition,
improvements in productivity make goods and .services cheaper (in real
terms) than they used to be. It is clear that productivity improvements
over the last century have been disproportionately concentrated in
manufactured goods, for which the application of non-animal energy and
techniques of mass production have dramatically increased output.1 This
means that the real price of manufactured goods has fallen faster than the
real price of services. If investment draws on manufactured goods more
~ The true extent of the concentration of productivity improvements in manufacturing
is difficult to determine, because output of the service sector is so hard to measure. But the
direction of the bias is not in doubt.Figure 1
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than it draws on services, then it has to be the case that the relative price
of investment goods falls as productivity rises.
Note that this positive feedback mechanism, and its resulting impli-
cations for unconditional divergence, do not depend on international
trade. Completely autarkic economies would enjoy the same positive
feedback as productivity rose, and this positive feedback would amplify
income differences resulting from productivity differences. The real
exchange rate figures provided in De Long’s paper are the manifestation
of the underlying disproportionate rates of productivity improvement,
not the cause.
FEEDBACK EFFECTS ARE NOT SMOOTH OR CONTINUOUS
Referring back to Figure 1, .the correlation between log income and
population growth falls to -0.3 if only countries above the median
income (about $3,000) are considered. For countries above $10,000 (the
income level where the regression line crosses the U.S. population growth
rate of 1 percent), the correlation is actually +0.15, though this positive
correlation is not significantly different from zero. Thus, among the
approximately 30 countries with income at least as high as Slovenia or
Korea, there appears to be no further depressing effect of income
increases on population growth. Hence, rather than a function q~ln(y) as
modeled by De Long, it would seem more appropriate to think of a
demographic transition that countries must traverse, reducing their
population growth rate from something like 2.5 percent per year to
something like 1 percent or less. With the exception of small, natural
resource-rich countries and countries with high immigration rates, all
wealthy countries have made this transition. Rising income helps in
making this transition, but it is clearly not a necessary condition, as
demonstrated by the important examples of China and the other formerly
Communist states.2
This one-time demographic transition has different steady-state
implications than the model analyzed by De Long. Essentially, two
classes of steady states exist, one class in which the demographic
transition has been made, and one class in which it has not. The two
classes will have very different levels of per capita income, but within
classes the amplification effect described by De Long for differences in
initial productivity levels will not operate. One way to think of it may be
that higher productivity increases the probability of making the demo-
graphic transition, rather than increasing steady-state income per se.
This suggests that the endogeneity of population growth was more
2 Interestingly, very few countries that have achieved population growth of I percent
or less are not either high-income or once-Communist.DISCUSSION 171
important historically than it will be prospectively. While it clearly helps
us in understanding what happened in the United States over the past
century and what will happen to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa over
the next several decades, it is apparently irrelevant to understanding
what will happen in China or the former Soviet Union.
Finally, understanding that income affects population growth, and
probably does so in a highly nonlinear way, has implications for the
econometric specification of the conditional convergence regressions that
De Long discusses. Accepting the population growth rate as a nonlinear
function of income suggests that the conditional convergence regres-
sions have to be estimated as part of some kind of nonlinear system of
equations.
SOURCES OF DIFFERENCES IN TOTAL FACTOR
PRODUCTIVITY ACROSS TIME AND SPACE
I do not think that it is productive to engage in extended debate
regarding which factors that shift production functions ought to be
labeled technology and which ought to be labeled something else. What
I do think is productive is to recognize that production functions differ
for several distinct reasons, and with different implications for economic
analysis. My personal list would look something like this:
~ Hardware:. technology embodied in equipment;
o Software: technology embodied in digital programs, training man-
uals, textbooks, and other places where knowledge is encoded in
. ways that can be read by others;
¯ Human capital: skills that can be taught, or acquired through
learning by doing;
¯ Ideas: knowledge carried by humans in their minds that cannot be
or is not encoded in software;
¯ Institutional and market factors: political, legal, and social forces that
affect efficiency;
, Idiosyncrasies: everything else.
These shifters of the production function differ in the nature of
incentives that surround their creation and in the economic forces that
govern their spread. For example, ideas are nonrival in use, meaning that
their use in one context does not deplete them. Software also is largely
nonrival, equipment is less so, and human capital is largely rival. This
means that their contribution to output is likely to be characterized by
increasing returns to scale, with implications for growth as captured in
the new growth theory models.
Another important characteristic is the extent to which factors are
excludable, meaning that it is possible to prevent people who do not pay
for them from using them. Human capital is mostly excludable, but172 Adam B. Ja~e
hardware and software are only partially so. This means that their
creation produces spillovers, implying that their contribution to output
and hence growth exceeds their returns to their creators. Finally, hard-
ware and software are largely portable and tradable, facilitating their
diffusion around the world; human capital and ideas are much less so. By
identifying and analyzing these distinct categories, we can begin to
understand the economic forces driving productivity improvement and
hence growth.